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2. Abstract 
Over the past decade, online peer-to-peer lending has emerged as a viable alternative to 
traditional consumer finance by connecting individuals with small financing needs with 
individual investors seeking the consistent returns of lending traditionally reserved for financial 
institutions. To date, the literature on leading loan providers like Lending Club and Prosper 
Marketplace is relatively sparse and has failed to keep up with the constantly changing industry 
funding standards. This study contributes to this body of literature by examining information that 
is unverified by the Lending Club such as stated loan purpose and homeownership. While 
previous studies have examined a now obsolete interest rate auction process and used machine 
learning techniques to analyze complex loan descriptions, this study differentiates itself by 
examining the current Lending Club industry standard and incorporating a larger subset of data. 
Our results indicate that these unverified factors are significantly correlated with loan 
performance but also that Lending Club’s interest rate assignment process acts as a partial 
control for these deviations. While statistically significant disparities do emerge even after 
Lending Club’s interest rate assignment process, these marginal differences become 
economically insignificant because of practical complications in effectively exploiting them, 
thereby suggesting Lending Club has constructed an efficient market for these loans. 
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3. Introduction 
 Despite all the great waves of innovation of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, basic 
consumer finance is still primarily carried out through traditional banks. While this has long been 
the case, a series of innovative financial technology companies led by Lending Club and Prosper 
Marketplace are beginning to reshape consumer credit markets through the advent of online 
peer-to-peer (P2P) lending. Online peer-to-peer lending works by assigning small scale 
borrowers (generally those asking for less than $35,000) an interest rate and helping them get 
their loan funded by connecting them with lenders who each contribute a small fraction of the 
principal and receive residual income through interest payments. The intermediaries generate 
profit through small servicing costs. Since its founding in 2006 through the end of 2015, Lending 
Club issued over $15.9 billion in loans, distancing itself from its biggest competitor Prosper’s $6 
billion and emerging as the U.S. market leader in online P2P lending1.  
 This study examines the role of unverified and soft information in the payment patterns 
of online peer-to-peer borrowers utilizing data from the Lending Club. Unverified information 
refers to the components of loan applications which are not always verified in the Lending 
Club’s loan review process. Soft information is non-quantifiable information that can still be 
materially important. Burke et. al (2012) describes an illustrative example of unverified 
information in noting how borrowers for homes often provide past rent and utility repayment 
history to banks but the banks do not actually always verify this information. In a similar bent, 
                                                          1 Lending Club loan issuance as of December 31, 2015. Updated numbers can be found at https://www.lendingclub.com/public/about-us.action. Prosper loan issuance as of February 22, 2016. Updated numbers found at https://www.prosper.com/plp/about/.  
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Lending Club does not necessarily verify all information provided by a borrower in the review of 
every loan application. As an example of soft information in the context of business lending, 
Petersen (2004) cites how in evaluating potential businesses to which to lend, bank 
representatives perceive soft information such as “the ability of the manager, their honesty, the 
way they react under pressure.” Surely these are unquantifiable characteristics, but they certainly 
have material impact on the creditworthiness of the firm.  
 This analysis centers on the information that borrowers provide to potential lenders in 
their profile but which are not always verified in the Lending Club’s loan review process or are 
non-quantifiable. While profile verification can happen, it does not occur for every loan and 
investors often must choose loans before a final profile verification and hence must evaluate 
these borrower-supplied factors with a degree of uncertainty. These verification factors, home 
ownership, employment length, gross income, debt-to-income ratio and location, all have real 
effects on a borrower’s likelihood of making interest payments on time and fully repaying their 
loan. Although each of these factors influence a borrower’s repayment likelihood, without 
verification investors must consider these data-points with some hesitation. For instance, for 
loans issued in 2014, 29 percent of monthly incomes were verified and 41 percent had the source 
of income verified. 2 Intriguingly, Lending Club internal analysis has shown that from 2010 to 
2014 non-verified loans were charged-off less often than income verified and income-source 
verified loans.3  
                                                          2 Lending Club categorizes a loan’s income verification status as either “income verified,” “income source verified” or “not verified.” “Income verified” indicates Lending Club has confirmed the borrower’s stated income is within 10% of their stated income amount and “income source verified” indicates Lending Club has confirmed the source of a borrower’s income.  3 Lending Club analysis utilized data in their Loan Stats dataset that is same source of data as this thesis (“Income Verification”).  
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 My research differentiates itself from the prior literature by focusing on Lending Club 
and the current industry standard of online P2P lending, by incorporating a continuous variable 
for loan repayment that strictly differentiates between delinquent and non-delinquent loans, and 
by having more data from a longer period of time. With loans lasting for 36 or 60 months, much 
more data is now available for the complete loan cycle activity since Lending Club was only 
founded in 2006.  
 My research serves two central purposes. Firstly, it provides insight into whether 
investors should consider qualitative and unverified factors in their assessment of Lending Club 
loans. Our research finds that even when controlling for loan grade, loans of different purpose do 
not perform equally. To investors only able to afford a few loans of any given grade, this is 
material information as it suggests investors should systemically choose and avoid certain loan 
purposes. These discrepancies lead to a discussion of the degree to which Lending Club has 
created an efficient market for consumer loans. To address this question, we consider the 
predictive power of our model relative to that of just using Lending Club assigned interest rates.
 Research in this topic provides further insight into the customers of one of the fastest 
growing companies in the U.S. and broadens the understanding of online consumer credit 
markets. As more technologically inclined generations reach adulthood and begin managing their 
own credit, they will increasingly seek out these new forms of credit. While great potential 
exists, comprehensive examinations of these markets are few and far between because online 
P2P lending has only really emerged as an alternative to traditional finance in the past decade. 
Through comparing logit estimations of the probability of a borrower becoming delinquent on a 
certain loan, we evaluate the importance of unverified factors in a borrower’s loan application as 
well as the predictive strength of Lending Club’s interest rate assignment policy. This research 
Director 7  
contributes to the understanding of the functioning of these markets by examining how 
unverified and qualitative factors drive certain borrowers to delinquency.  
This begins with an analysis of the prior literature in online peer-to-peer lending as well 
as a discussion of information acquisition and signaling in credit markets. Following the review 
is the theoretical model outlining the agents in online peer-to-peer markets and how both verified 
and unverified information affects their decision process. Next is a discussion of the econometric 
model and accompanying data used to analyze the impact of these different types of information. 
Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of these results. 
4. Literature Review 
 There is a growing body of literature about online P2P lending as well as a vast research 
on the workings of consumer finance, lending, and financial intermediaries. Broadly, the relevant 
research are text studies in online finance, various examinations of the role of signaling and 
information acquisition in finance, and cheap talk in lending. Much of the pre-existing literature 
on online P2P borrower behavior utilizes data from Prosper.com involving a now obsolete 
interest rate setting process. In this process, borrowers were allowed to request an interest rate 
and then be funded at an interest rate determined through an auction process. Prosper no longer 
utilizes this system and Lending Club has never used this system, so it is valuable to examine 
how financing works when interest rates are set by the intermediary only. 
 Multiple papers have studied how textual information and the formation of narratives can 
not only influence lenders but have real correlation with loan performance. Firstly, Gao and Lin 
(2015) analyzed text descriptions in Prosper and Lending Club using a machine learning 
approach and determined that readability, positivity, objectivity and deception cues all are 
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correlated with loan repayment prospects. Herzenstein et al (2011) likewise analyzed over 1,000 
loan descriptions from Prosper.com and found that different identity features crafted in a loan 
description can make suggestions about loan performance. These papers certainly suggest 
lenders could benefit from loan descriptions, but this is a now obsolete element.4 As such, it is 
valuable to assess loans with the information with which investors are actually being provided 
today. By focusing on a set list of loan purposes, our analysis provides investors a tool to 
correctly interpret qualitative information.  
 Significant research suggests that lenders do in fact try to glean additional information 
out of lenders beyond that which is verified. This research was primarily done using Prosper 
data, so shifting sources to Lending Club provides new insight and expands the research 
literature to a larger dataset. Michels (2012) determined that for Prosper, unverifiable disclosures 
could help lower interest rates by 1.27% and increase bid activity by 8%. The findings of 
Michels suggest a potential benefit to investors who can accurately assess Lending Club’s 
unverified information. Kawai et al. (2014) examined Prosper’s interest rate auction process in 
which a borrower sent a maximum interest rate to lenders. Kawai et al. suggest and give 
substantial evidence to say that a low maximum rate can signal good credit to potential lenders 
by telling them they have other potential sources of credit and are likely in good financial 
standing. Iyer et al. (2014) determined that non-expert lenders who utilized Prosper’s interest 
rate auction setting did in fact make an effort to infer additional information about loans and 
were able to accurately infer about one-third of this additional information.  
                                                          4 On March 19, 2014 the Lending Club formally discontinued the use of descriptions citing how loan description reviews took at least 24 hours, typically less time than the few hours it typically takes for loans to be funded (“Changes to loan listings”). 
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 As such, we set out to reframe this type of analysis but by updating it to the current 
specifications for loan selection utilized by the largest intermediary, Lending Club. Loan purpose 
is the closest element in today’s online P2P market to a loan description, so examining 
correlations between loan purpose and performance is the current equivalent of this type of 
analysis. In examining these purposes, we gain insight into the potential that investors should 
give preference for certain borrower types in much the same was as someone would previously 
choose amongst loans through their descriptions. 
 I base much of my econometric analysis on the work of Mach et al. (2014). Mach et al. 
utilizes a logistic regression to assess the performance of small business loans on Lending Club. 
We expand this loan purpose analysis to a wider set of loan purposes as well as include a 
continuous variable to determine how much principle was repaid, giving investors more insight 
into the nature of these delinquencies. Additionally, our research extends Mach’s work to a much 
larger dataset since Lending Club total loan issuance ballooned from less than 100,000 loans to 
nearly 1.3 million from 2012 to 2015.5 Hence, I distinguish my research through further defining 
loan performance and extending to more unverified factors. Even with respect to the in-depth 
analysis of small business loans in Mach et al, our analysis supports the relevance of this 
research because it shows the underperformance of small business loans has been maintained 
even since Lending Club began offering small business loans in 2014 and business lines of credit 
in 20156.  
                                                          5 At the end of 2012, Lending Club had issued 95,902 loans worth $1,178,238,775. At the end of 2015, those numbers had grown to 1,276,150 loans worth $15,982,054,451.  6 While anyone applying for a traditional Lending Club loan can state “Small Business” as their loan purpose, today borrowers with established businesses with sales over $75,000 that have been in business for two or more years can apply for a formal Lending Club business loan. These loans are between $5,000 and $300,000 with maturities between one and five years (Small Business Loans). 
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5. Theoretical Model 
 The theoretical model encompasses three agents, each trying to maximize his respective 
utility through his engagement with a series of decisions. These agents, of course, are 1) 
borrowers seeking to ensure they meet their immediate cash needs and receive a loan while 
minimizing their interest expense, 2) the intermediary seeking to maximize profit through 
underwriting loans and collecting fees, and 3) lenders seeking to maximize their investment 
return while minimizing risk.  
5.1. Assumptions 
 The model herein is predicated on a few major assumptions about payment capabilities, 
borrowers, the intermediary, and lenders. Firstly, it is assumed that a single late payment in a 
given period results in immediate default for all subsequent periods. This naturally is not the 
case, as borrowers in actuality can miss or make late payments and continue to pay in future 
periods. Additionally, the model ignores the possibility of early payments and instead assumes a 
borrower can only make the minimum payment each month in full. While these assumptions 
may not describe real online or traditional lending markets, the absence of such payments 
patterns will not inhibit the implications of the model as it still describes each agent’s approach 
to his problem. Moreover, our empirical analysis adopts this binary framework in evaluating 
delinquency probabilities and in only considering the total amount of principle repaid, so little is 
lost in this generalized framework. 
 As for the agents, all are assumed to be rational and abide by some homogenous 
characteristics within their given population. All investors are risk-averse and seek to maximize 
return and minimize risk. Determining unverified information is costlier than determining 
Director 11  
verified information, a realistic setting since much of the verified information is provided by a 
credit agency rather than the Lending Club. All borrowers are assumed to be rational, meaning 
they seek out a loan only if they have determined the immediate cash infusion is worth either 
making 36 or 60 future payments or risking defaulting and hurting their credit profile.  
5.2. The Borrower’s Problem 
 The decision of a borrower can be looked at as a three step decision process. Firstly, he 
determines whether he needs an immediate cash infusion in the form of a loan. Secondly, he 
determines if he should accept a loan through the Lending Club. Finally, each month a borrower 
assesses whether the utility-maximizing decision is to make the next repayment, suffer a 
delinquent payment, or even default on their loan.  
 With our study’s focus on the role of verified or unverified information, we break 
borrowers into two types, those who have a high probability of repayment, and those who have a 
low probability of repayment. A borrower’s type is determined by all verified and unverified 
factors and gives the true underlying probability that a borrower makes all his payments on time. 
Hence, we construct the set below to represent the underlying true distribution of all borrowers, 
where Φ is the borrower’s type. 
Φ = ሼܪ, ܮሽ 
 While there are only two true borrower types in our theoretical model, lenders cannot 
determine this information with exact accuracy. Hence, we determine now that a borrower of 
type ܪ has probability 1 of being a likely to repay borrower and a borrower of type ܮ has 
probability 0 of being a likely to repay borrower. However, as we will demonstrate below, a 
lender’s job in choosing among loans of one interest rate is to determine his estimate of 
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Φ (denoted Φᇱ) that will help him choose one loan of a given rate versus another. One should 
also note that high probability borrowers can still default or make late payments and that a low 
probability borrower can still make all payments, but that this will only occur given some shock 
ε during the months after the loan is funded that is unforeseen or unexpected. After he has taken 
out a loan, a borrower is faced with a decision between the cost of repayment and the cost of 
default in each period t: 
ܿ௧ = ൜ ߝ௧    ܫ݂ ݎ݁݌ܽݕܦ௧(Φ)   ܱݐℎ݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ 
 The equation above for the cost of repayment normalizes a borrower’s cost to zero and 
adds ߝ to represent any period-specific shock that makes completing a loan repayment 
exceptionally manageable or difficult. The expected value of the shock ߝ௧ is equal to 0 and it is 
assumed to be independent of borrower type Φ. Example shocks for non-zero ε could be a lost 
job (ε > 0) or winning a local lottery (ε < 0) that makes the difficulty of loan repayment harder or 
easier than expected. The equation ܦ௧(Φ)is the cost of default for a borrower subject to his type 
Φ and the period t wherein default occurs. This is a function of borrower type, as we assume 
good borrowers determine it is suboptimal to default more than their low probability peers. It is 
also a function of time as defaulting sooner with a larger balance has a larger effect then 
defaulting later. This illustrates that a borrower’s only major reason not to default when using an 
online P2P lender like Lending Club that does not take collateral is the impact to one’s credit 
score.  
 Forecasting across all the time periods of the loan, the borrower’s expected utility 
maximization problem comes down to maximizing his expectation of whether it is better to take 
out a loan in Period 0 and accept the costs from periods 1 to T, where T is the loan’s maturity, to 
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pay to a certain point and default, or to not take out a loan at all. We let ߜ denote the discount 
factor, where ߜ ߳ (0,1).  
ܷ =
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ൬ܷ(ܮ݋ܽ݊) − (෍ ߜ௧ܿ௧)்௧ୀଵ ൰   ܫ݂ ܽܿܿ݁݌ݐ ܽ݊݀ ݉ܽ݇݁ ݈݈ܽ ݌ܽݕ݉݁݊ݐݏ
ܷ(ܮ݋ܽ݊) − ቆ෍ ߜ௧ܿ௧)௧
∗ିଵ
௧ୀଵ ቇ − ܦ௧(Φ௧∗) ܫ݂ ܽܿܿ݁݌ݐ ܽ݊݀ ݌ܽݕ ݑ݊ݐ݅ ݂݀݁ܽݑݐ ݅݊ ݌݁ݎ݅݋݀ ݐ∗0   ܱݐℎ݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁
 
5.3 The Lending Club’s Problem 
As the intermediary, the Lending Club can be viewed as an expert middleman (Biglaiser 
1993). The intermediary’s goal is to maximize profit through extracting the most in fee revenue 
and minimizing costs. Since the Lending Club’s pricing structure is set right now, the main goal 
is to facilitate the largest amount of loan issuance while minimizing costs. In order to do this 
successfully, it should be in their objective to encourage the most people to use their lending 
service. We assume the Lending Club adds no value to an individual loan for either a borrower 
or an investor. Instead, it provides the borrower value by connecting him to a wide array of 
investors. For investors, it provides access to a number of borrowers and also facilitates 
information through assigning borrowers interest rates and grades that inform them of a 
borrower’s position.  
Beyond these traditional goals of an intermediary, Lending Club in its growing rivalry 
with Prosper presents an example of a two-sided market with opportunities for increasing returns 
to scale. As early stage platform companies seeking to increase market share, both Lending Club 
and Prosper have a huge incentive to be the online platform of choice for both lenders and 
borrowers. Given that the internet is not a commodity industry, increasing scale is extremely 
cheap for Lending Club and Prosper. Arthur (1996) foresaw “When Internet-based retail banking 
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arrives, regional demand limitations will vanish. Each virtual bank will gain in advantage as its 
network increases.”  In such a situation, network effects arise in which more borrowers and 
lenders opt for one intermediary and thus increase the volume of loans on that platform and 
thereby encourage future borrowers and lenders to choose that intermediary (Arthur 1996).  
 Recognizing this opportunity for increasing returns to scale, Lending Club has a huge 
incentive to create the rate setting process that the most borrowers and lenders trust. Burke et al 
(2012) use a model for mortgage markets to examine the marginal cost of adding more 
incremental information to a potential loan profile and whether that additional benefit is actually 
optimal. Burke et al argues there exists an optimal amount of information a traditional mortgage 
broker should acquire that keeps the broker’s reputation strong while minimizing his costs. In 
this situation of increasing returns to scale, the price for a strong reputation would likely be 
higher than that of a mortgage market as network effects make it crucial the intermediary 
becomes the online lending platform of choice. Thus, for the intermediary, considering 
unverifiable information is important because it increases its reputation and suggests to potential 
borrowers and lenders they have the best, most reliable service. 
5.4. The Lender’s Problem 
 We assume investors are risk averse and aim to maximize their risk-adjusted internal 
rates of return. We assume all risk minimization considerations are decided by selecting an 
interest rate and therefore the borrower is only concerned about return at the next stage of 
selection. Given this assumption, the lender is only interested in returns for the pre-determined 
interest rate. In this circumstance, he tries to maximize his return by trying to best assess which 
borrower at a given interest rate will make the most repayments. Hence, the investor’s return 
function can be modeled as below: 
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ܴ = ݊ ∗ ݌ 
ܴ = Return on loan; ݊ = Number of Payments Made; p = Repayment Value which can 
be normalized to 1. 
 For our model, how a lender will actually achieve his highest return is by being best able 
to predict the borrower’s type Φ by assessing a combination of verified and unverified 
information most effectively and picking the loan with a predicted borrower type Φ′ that is 
closest to 1. Lenders are unable to determine a borrower’s “type,” but they are provided with the 
composition of the borrower’s verified and self-reported information. Thus, lenders seek to 
estimate the borrower’s type as a linear combination of verified and unverified information: 
Φᇱ = ߠ௏ܸ +  ߠ௎ܷ 
Φᇱ = estimated borrower type  
ߠ௜ = sensitivity to verified (i = V)or unverified (i = U)information, θ୧ ∈ (0,1) 
ܸ = Borrowerᇱs verified information either ሼV୐, Vୌሽ with  subscript high or low 
ܷ = Borrowerᇱs unverified information, either ሼU୐, Uୌሽwith subscript high or low 
 The term ߠ௏ܸ is the product of the lender’s sensitivity to verified information multiplied 
by the verified information supplied to the lender via the intermediary. Likewise, the product 
ߠ௎ܸ represents the lender’s sensitivity to unverified information multiplied by the unverified 
information supplied to the lender via the intermediary but not verified. Lenders face uncertainty 
in interpreting these signals, and we assume better lenders have higher absolute values of ߠ′ݏ, 
especially ߠ௎ since they can glean the most information about a borrower’s type. We also 
assume that ௅ܸ <  ܷ௅ < 0 < ܷு <  ுܸ since verified bad information is the worst thing a lender 
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could see and verified good information is the best thing he could see in determining if a 
borrower is of type H or L. 
 We can assume Φᇱ ∈ (0,1), where the higher the number is the more confident a lender is 
that the borrower is type ܪ. Thus, a value of one would indicate a lender’s complete confidence a 
borrower is type  ܪ and zero would indicate complete confidence a borrower is type ܮ, and any 
number in between is the borrower’s assumption of the borrower’s type.  
 Finally, now that we have determined an estimate of a borrower’s type, we illustrate how 
a P2P lender can use this information to maximize expected return subject to discount rate ߜ by 
choosing the loan with the highest maximum expected return which is determined by the lender’s 
prediction of Φᇱ and the repayment value ௧ܲ which was normalized to 1 above: 
E[R] = ܧ[෍ ௧ܲ ∙
்
௧ୀଵ
ߜ௧] = ෍ ܧ[ ௧ܲ] ∙
்
௧ୀଵ
ߜ௧ = ෍ ܧ[ ௧ܲ|Φ] ∙
்
௧ୀଵ
ߜ௧ = ෍[ ௧ܲ|ܧ[Φ]] ∙
்
௧ୀଵ
ߜ௧ 
= ෍[ ௧ܲ| Φᇱ] ∙
்
௧ୀଵ
ߜ௧ = ෍[ ௧ܲ|ߠ௏ ஻ܸ + ߠ௎ܷ஻] ∙
்
௧ୀଵ
ߜ௧ 
 
5.5. Synthesis of Theoretical Model Discussion 
 The theoretical framework above outlines the basic decisions with which the different 
participants in this market are faced. Using the empirical analysis outlined below, we show how 
understanding of unverified information could influence each of these parties and seek to append 
or modify these models to illustrate how each agent can maximize his own objective. It is 
plausible that borrowers could utilize this information to determine what information to share 
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and potentially look at this through the lens of cheap talk since they are effectively sending 
unconfirmed information to investors. The Lending Club could utilize this information to more 
accurately determine what credit group to assign a borrower to, or they could perhaps further 
specify a borrowers’ delinquency risk and thereby create more narrow debt tranches. As 
discussed, this presents an opportunity for the Lending Club to emerge as the dominant platform 
and benefit from network effects that will yield increasing returns to scale. Finally, investors can 
gain insight on whether different borrowers default differently and if there is a way to make a 
more specific investor model that better describes their decision process and also sheds light on 
how best to consider unverified information in the allocation of investment capital. 
 This framework provides rationale for why investors may not use unverified information 
in their analysis even if statistically significant deviations are found between loans with different 
unverified characteristics. Two potential explanations are costs associated with information 
verification or undersupply of loans of certain types. This could be explained in this theoretical 
model if one considers that lenders have costs attached with increasing Θ௎(sensitivity to 
unverified information) to a level high enough to use unverified information effectively. 
Additionally, the other implication could be explained as undersupply if one assumes that lenders 
are in fact fully informed of the impact of unverified information in deducing a borrower’s type 
but because of a dearth of supply in loans with certain characteristics they fund suboptimal loans. 
Having outlined the potential importance of unverified information to each market participant, 
we now explain the empirical model utilized to analyze the extent to which unverified 
information can be used as a predictor of loan performance. 
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6. Empirical Model 
 To gain insight on Lending Club’s assessment of loans, we estimate a linear regression of 
the interest rate paid on the loans with robust standard errors: 
ܴܽݐ݁௜௫௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݁ݎ௫ +  ߚଶܮ݋ܽ݊௜௫௧ +  ߚଷܻ݁ܽݎ௜ +  ߠ௧ + ߝ௜௫௧ 
Rate is the Lending Club assigned interest rate for loan i to borrower x in year t. Purpose 
is the borrower’s stated purpose of the loan. Borrower is a vector for the characteristics of the 
borrower. Loan is a vector for the characteristics of the loan. Year is an indicator variable for the 
year the loan was issued. Borrower consists of characteristics about the borrower such as his 
FICO score, housing and employment status, and characteristics of the county he resides in. 
Loan contains characteristics specific to the loan itself such as its term and amount. The variable 
ߠ is a state effect which we use in both the random and fixed effects estimation and ߝ is an error 
term. These vectors represent the different decisions a lender is faced with evaluating from the 
theoretical model. Borrower variables are unique to the individual borrower, loan variables give 
insight on how different loans fare across loan types and year and state fixed effects control for 
other differentiating factors. 
 After establishing a model of Lending Club’s interest rate assignment, we estimate loan 
performance through a measure of delinquency then a continuous model based on the amount of 
principle repaid. Firstly, we consider logit estimates of whether the loan becomes delinquent or 
not7: 
                                                          7 We supplement our findings with probit estimates but take our logit estimates to be the most accurate and use these in comparative analyses. Both of these analyses carried out with robust standard errors. 
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Pr (ܦ݈݁݅݊ݍ௜௫௧ = 1)  = ܨ(ߚ଴ + ߚଵܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݁ݎ௫ +  ߚଶܮ݋ܽ݊௜௫௧ +  ߚଷܻ݁ܽݎ௜ + ߚସܸ݁ݎ݂݅ݕ௜௫௧ +
ߚହܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ௜) 
where ܨ(ݔ)  =  ୣ౮(ଵା௘ೣ) 
 A loan is classified as delinquent if it is either in default, charged off, or late beyond 30 
days. The above probability model contains the vectors from the interest rate calculation as well 
as a new dummy variable Verify for income verification and a continuous variable for the 
fraction of the loan funded by investors as compared to the Lending Club.  
To control for potentially skewed results, we repeat these regressions with restrictions on 
the loan grade as well as the date of the loan’s issuance. Repeating the regressions only for 
individual grades of a loan ensure that loan purposes that are typically issued to lower quality 
borrowers do not appear to have outsized bad performance8. Additionally, we repeat the 
regression restricted to 36 month loans issued on or before December 31, 2012 and 60 month 
loans issued on or before December 31, 2010. This allows us to focus our analysis on only those 
loans which have gone through their whole payment life cycle.  
 After establishing this binary measure, we turn to a continuous measure of loan 
performance by taking a linear estimate the fraction of principle repaid: 
ܲݎ݅݊ܿ௜௫௧ = ߚ଴+ ߚଵܲݑݎ݌݋ݏ݁௜௫ +  ߚଶܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݁ݎ௫ + ߚଷܮ݋ܽ݊௜௫௧ +  ߚସܻ݁ܽݎ௜ + ߚହܸ݁ݎ݂݅ݕ௜௫௧
+ ߚ଺ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ௜ + ߠ௧ + ߝ௫ 
 We utilize simple OLS as well as state level random and fixed effects estimates with 
robust standard errors with the same vectors from the delinquency estimate. Princ is computed as 
                                                          8 The distribution of loan grades for each loan purpose can be found in Figure 5 of Section 7.  
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the total amount of principle received by investors divided by the amount of the loan. To ensure 
current loans do not skew results, we only estimate this continuous measure for 36 month loans 
issued on or before December 31, 2012 and 60 month loans issued on or before December 31, 
2010. Again, we repeat our analysis by individual loan grade to ensure there are no biases 
already found by the Lending Club. 
7. Data 
 This analysis utilizes individual loan-level data from the Lending Club for loans issued 
between 2007 and December 31, 20159. This Loan Statistics dataset contains loan and borrower 
characteristics as well as performance results for 874,206 loans. The dataset contains the 
following relevant information: Lending Club loan subgrade, funded interest rate, borrower zip 
code, borrower state, number of delinquencies in past two years, month of borrower’s earliest 
credit line, employment length, borrower’s FICO score range, amount of the loan, home 
ownership, reported income, whether and how income was verified, number of open credit lines, 
loan purpose, term of loan, the loan’s current status, the borrower’s revolving credit balance and 
utilization rates, and the amount funded by investors. Utilizing the borrower’s zip code, we also 
provide insight into how the population of a borrower’s county and its per capita income 
influence loan performance. Table 11.1.1 in the appendix contains tables outlining key summary 
statistics for each quantitative variable as well as information on the distribution of different 
loans by their loan grade, purpose, and other factors. 
 Figures 1 and 2 show informative distributions of loans and borrowers utilizing Lending 
Club. The average loan with Lending Club in our dataset had a principle of $14,767.70 with a 
                                                          9 These data can be found at https://www.lendingclub.com/info/download-data.action. 
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monthly principle payment of $437.02. We overlay the chart with a normal curve as the spikes 
represent round numbered loan values rather than major differences between loan value 
preferences. The average Median FICO score for borrowers is 696.65 with nearly all borrowers 
having a median FICO score above 662.10 
Figure 1. Loan Amount Distribution 
 
                                                          10 Two borrowers from 2007 had median FICO scores of 627 and 632, and the rest were all 662 or above. 
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Figure 2. Median FICO Score Distribution 
 
The figures below illustrate different trends observable in the data. Firstly, we see in 
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lowest interest rate loans and they are highly skewed to loans less than $10,000, whereas F and 
G, the lowest loans have many larger valued loans: 
Figure 3 Loan Amount by Loan Grade 
  
We also find in Figures 4 and 5, shown below, that Lending Club has been diligent in 
issuing loans mainly with less default risk. This supports our discussion of the Lending Club’s 
current position as an emerging platform that does not want to issue too many bad, delinquent 
loans or else run the risk of a consumer departure to Prosper. Each year, as Lending Club has 
distanced itself from Prosper, it has become more willing to issue riskier, higher interest rate 
loans. Figure 3 also suggests a network effect occurring for those seeking debt relief by the 
overwhelmingly issuance of loans intended for refinancing of credit card debt and debt 
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consolidations. This is evidence that borrowers have identified the benefit of borrowing through 
a platform such as lender for these purposes and have thus continued to utilize this service. Inter 
Figure 4 Yearly Interest Rate Distributions
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8. Results and Findings: 
8.1 Interest Rate Analysis 
 To estimate Lending Club’s interest rate formulation, we estimate a linear regression:  
ܴܽݐ݁௜௫௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܤ݋ݎݎ݋ݓ݁ݎ௫ +  ߚଶܮ݋ܽ݊௜௫௧ +  ߚଷܻ݁ܽݎ௜ +  ߠ௧ + ߝ௜௫௧ 
Interest rate paid is the interest rate expressed as a percent value, not as a decimal. 
Purpose is an indicator variable for the stated loan purpose with Car Financing being the base 
case. Home indicates whether the borrower is a renter or home owner as compared to the base 
case of someone with a mortgage. Term is a dummy variable to differentiate between 36 and 60 
month loans. Amount is the listed amount of the loan applied for by the borrower11. FICO 
corresponds to the median of the borrower’s FICO range at the time the loan was originated. 
Employment is the number of years the borrower has been employed12. Income is the per-capita 
income, in thousands of dollars of the county from which the borrower applied for the loan. 
Population is the population, in thousands of people, of the county from which the borrower 
applied for the loan13. Years range from 2007 to 2015. Finally, ߠ is a control for state level fixed- 
and random-effects in year t. 
                                                          11 If the credit department elects to reduce the loan amount at a certain point in time, this value reflects that change. 12 This variable is truncated to zero or ten if employment length is less than one year or greater than ten years, respectively. 13 For both population and income, county level data comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s “Local Area Personal Income accounts CA1-3” series. This data has been collapsed to align with the borrower’s zip code and averaged over the eight years. Because of a lack of available county data, 1,346 of 875,552 observations were deleted. 
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 Our regression results using ordinary least squares and random- and fixed- state effects 
are shown in the appendix in Table 11.2.1. Controlling for these factors, results indicate Lending 
Club assigned interest rates are not consistent across loan purposes. Results indicate that loans 
aimed at refinancing credit card debt are assigned interest rates 1.65 percentage points lower than 
car financing loans, all else being equal. Conversely, small business loans and moving expense 
interest rates were 3.27 and 3.13 percentage points higher, respectively. Also renewable energy 
financings, home down payments, dream vacations and other purposes all increased the interest 
rate by at least two percentage points.  
 Results also indicate a $1000 increase in the amount of the loan increased the interest rate 
by 0.07 percentage points. Each additional year someone had been working affected a decrease 
of .002 percentage points. A one-point increase in FICO scores lowered the interest rate by .06 
percentage points. Higher borrower-reported annual incomes lowered interest rates by .003 
percentage points per $1,000. Increasing the term of the loan from 36 to 60 months raised the 
interest rate by 3.84 percentage points. For every $1,000 increase in per-capita county income, 
loans received a .004 percentage point decrease in the assigned interest rate. Finally, home 
owners received 0.43 percentage point higher interest rates and renters received 0.48 percentage 
point higher interest rates. Additionally, loans funded in 2009, 2012, 2013 and 2014 received the 
highest interest rates. 
8.2 Loan Purpose and Delinquency Analysis: 
 In the aggregate, we find statistically significant relationships between loan performance 
and unverified factors such as loan performance, verification, and self-reported income. Firstly, 
we find that small business loans are the worst performers followed by renewable energy 
financing and moving expenses loans. The best performing purposes were credit card and car 
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refinancings, debt consolidations, and wedding expenses. In Table 8.2.1 below, we compare 
results of our delinquency analysis for each loan purpose with the interest rate coefficients we 
determined from Lending Club. 
Table 8.2.1: Logit Delinquency vs. Interest Rate Analysis
 
Marginal Effects Fixed Effects
Delinquency coef/se Interest Rate coef/se
Refinancing Credit Card -0.008*** Refinancing Credit Card -1.654***(0.002) (0.026)Wedding Expenses -0.003 Consolidate Debt -0.187***(0.004) (0.034)Car Financing (Base) Car Financing (Base)
Consolidate Debt 0.005** Educational 0.273**(0.002) (0.108)Major Purchase 0.008*** Home Improvement 0.294***(0.003) (0.033)Home Improvement 0.010*** Major Purchase 0.384***(0.002) (0.046)Vacation 0.020*** Wedding Expenses 1.273***(0.004) (0.067)Other 0.021*** Medical Expenses 1.977***(0.002) (0.046)Home Down Payment 0.023*** Vacation 2.141***(0.004) (0.062)Medical Expenses 0.025*** Other 2.174***(0.004) (0.035)Educational 0.026** Home Down Payment 2.875***(0.011) (0.086)Moving Expenses 0.031*** Renewable Energy Financing 2.904***(0.004) (0.125)Renewable Energy Financing 0.040*** Moving Expenses 3.126***(0.012) (0.068)Small Business Loan 0.063*** Small Business Loan 3.269***(0.004) (0.057)
Number of observations 829,517 Number of observations 829,643Note: Measures marginal effect on delinquency, all else being at means. Delinquency is determined as having a loan status of "charged off,""default," or "late (31-120 days)"; robust standard errors shown below; * Denotes significance levels P<.01 - ***;  P<.05 - **;  P<.1 - *; State fixed effects included in estimation.  
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 These results clearly indicate that certain loan purposes do result in different loan 
performances, even when controlling for the factors that make up much of Lending Club's 
interest rate assignment model. However, when considering loans by their subgrades we find that 
much of the significance of these results are mitigated. As Tables 11.2.4 and 11.2.5 of the 
appendix show, for loans rated A through F, many purposes that were of minor initial 
significance lose their significance and those that were very significant reduce their significance. 
Repeating this within individual subgrades or regressing against interest rate also corroborates 
this finding. However, certain examples do still exist that show irregularity and incorrect interest 
rate assignment. Remarkably, in loan grades A through E Small Business loans underperform at 
the 1% significance level. For A and B loans, renewable energy financing and moving expenses 
also underperform as shown in Tables 4 and 5. While an immediate reaction is to assume that 
this is a result of worse performing loans being higher rated loans, irregularities such as the case 
of wedding expenses suggest some inconsistencies in Lending Club rate assignment.  
For investors, our results suggest investors should seek out those loans which are targeted 
at wedding expenses as they are often charged relatively higher rates for an extremely low 
delinquency rate. However, a test of Lending Club’s ability to create an efficient online 
marketplace is whether this irregularity will gradually be reduced through assigning lower 
interest rates to this loan category. With this being said, it is important to contextualize that 
wedding expenses only accounted for slightly more than 2,000 of the nearly 830,000 loans 
considered in our analysis. As such, it is difficult to foresee this as a major arbitrage opportunity. 
A topic for further research is to examine the market for these loan purposes with incongruous 
rates in Lending Club’s secondary market, the Note Trading Platform14. 
                                                          14 The Note Trading Platform is a service Lending Club offers hosted by FOLIOfn Investments, Inc. that creates a secondary market for speculative trading in outstanding Lending Club issued loans.  
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8.3 Income Verification Analysis: 
 As for borrowers’ incomes, our results support Lending Club’s claims that it adequately 
verifies borrowers’ incomes. For every $1,000 increase in self-reported annual income, Lending 
Club lowers interest rates by .003%. This lowered interest rate is matched by a .0002% deduction 
in the probability of a loan being delinquent.  
More importantly for Lending Club’s reputation as a fair loan provider is the 
performance of their verified loans. Table 8.3.1 below shows the relative change in performance 
between loans that receive no income verification, those of which the source is verified, and 
those of which the amount is verified. As shown by the positive coefficients of source and 
income verification, loans are more likely to become delinquent if they are taken out by 
borrowers on which Lending Club elects to perform income verification. Loans of which the 
source or amount of the borrower’s income are verified in the loan review process actually 
perform worse than their counterparts which are unverified, indicating that lending Club is taking 
sufficient measures to ensure fraudulent loans do not make it through the loan verification 
process.  
Table 8.3.1. Relationship Between Income Verification and Delinquency
Probit Marginal Effects Logit Marginal Effectscoef/se coef/se coef/se coef/seNone (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Source Verified 0.043*** 0.005*** 0.084*** 0.004***(0.006) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001)Amount Verified 0.068*** 0.008*** 0.126*** 0.006***(0.006) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001)
Note: Measures marginal effect on delinquency, all else being at means. Delinquency is determined as having a loan status of "charged off,""default," or "late (31-120 days)"; robust standard errors shown below; * Denotes significance levels P<.01 - ***;  P<.05 - **;  P<.1 - *; State fixed effects included in estimation.  
8.4 Aggregate Principle Payment Analysis: 
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 While Mach (2014) did a similar analysis of loan purpose, the analysis below contributes 
to the prior literature by incorporating the continuous variable of principle repayment. We find 
that borrowers asking for loans intended for car financing, wedding expenses, and credit card 
refinancing generally pay back the highest percent of the initial principle amount that is funded 
by the loan. Once more small business loans and renewable energy financing are found in the 
bottom quarter of loan performance. Interestingly, home down payments seem to be in the 
middle of the pack for principle repayment and delinquency rates yet still receive the third 
highest interest rate. Again this indicates a potential discrepancy between Lending Club’s 
interest rate assignment and the amount that an investor can expect to return on his investment. 
This does not necessarily determine irrational interest rate assignment, however, as this only 
considers the fraction of principle repaid and does not reflect the compensation investors receive 
in interest rate payments.  
8.5 Economic Rationales for Loan Purpose Results: 
 As the leading player in the U.S. online peer-to-peer lending market, Lending Club has 
established itself as a unique alternative to the traditional consumer finance marketplace. Still in 
its infancy as an organization, Lending Club has already created a robust market for borrowers 
seeking credit and investors seeking access to relatively safe consumer loans. In our analysis, we 
find that this market is somewhat efficient, but still presents a theoretical opportunity for 
arbitrage through selectively choosing loans that are intended for certain purposes. 
Corroborating the findings of Mach et al (2014), our analysis shows loans intended for 
small businesses consistently underperform, whereas wedding expenses and “other” loans tend to 
outperform their interest rate assignment when considering their performance in a binary bent of 
delinquent or not-delinquent. With this being said, Lending Club does assign lower rates to high 
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performing credit card re-financing, car financing, and debt consolidation loans and the highest 
rates to small business, moving expenses, and renewable energy financing, all bad performers.  
While Lending Club does not publish its model of interest rate assignment nor do 
borrowers still provide loan descriptions for investors, we are able to theorize some of the 
disparity between loan performances through economic rationales. Firstly, recalling that over 
99% of requested loans receive full funding, we are relatively confident borrowers have little 
economic incentive to deceive on a loan application unless they believe Lending Club will assign 
them a higher interest rate. Even if they were skeptical of this, the threat of being removed from 
the service for a fraudulent application suggests borrowers have deterrence from committing 
fraud.  
Thus, we now present rationales for why these discrepancies would occur. First, for high 
performing loan purposes, the purpose title suggests borrowers are in periods of life in which 
they would commit to strong financial footing. Should an individual make an effort to lower his 
credit card debt or consolidate his finances, he is making a conscious choice to address bad credit 
from his past. Lending Club is able to attract many individuals of this type by offering lower 
interest rates than their counterparts at traditional banks, so borrowers are receiving an interest 
rate that is not only in line but exceptionally manageable for their financial constraints. Likewise, 
major expenses such as a car financing or a wedding expense both address new periods in an 
individual’s life in which credit takes on an elevated importance. Thus, borrowers are well 
incentivized to make the payments on these loans. Although our analysis does not address this, it 
is also plausible that the monetary gifts individuals receive during a wedding serve as a large 
cash inflow that helps them to pay their loans faster. 
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Conversely, for those loans which have higher incidence of failure, borrowers at worst 
take on exceptional risk and at best are likely unconcerned with their credit. As Mach et al 
(2014) suggests, borrowers that opt for a loan for a small business through Lending Club’s 
consumer platform are likely unable to maintain credit access for their business and have a 
higher likelihood of failure. This has only become more probable since Lending Club began 
offering business loans and business lines of credit.15 
Similarly, loans for education are shown to be one of the worst performers in both our 
logistic and ordinary least squares regressions despite only having the fourth highest interest rate. 
The marginal effect of educational purpose on delinquency is a 2.6% increase over car 
financings, the fourth highest. However, educational loans are assigned only 0.27% higher than 
car financings, the fourth lowest, all else being equal.  
A possible explanation for this can be constructed when recalling that Herzenstein et al. 
(2011) found that lenders respond positively to crafted identities in online applications with 
descriptions. It is possible that lenders receive additional utility helping someone gain access to 
education, thereby increasing the demand for these loans and driving down their interest rates. 
On the other hand, those borrowers seeking out education are likely in a diminished financial 
standing as they require additional education to meet certain needs. Without empirical evidence 
to substantiate these claims, these rationales are not to be taken as concrete explanations but 
rather as examples to illustrate that inconsistencies in performance between borrowers of 
different loan purpose can be grounded in economical reasoning.  
 
                                                          15 While anyone applying for a traditional Lending Club loan can state “Small Business” as their loan purpose, today borrowers with established businesses with sales over $75,000 that have been in business for two or more years can apply for a formal Lending Club business loan. These loans are between $5,000 and $300,000 with maturities between one and five years (Small Business Loans).  
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8.6 Economic Rationales for Home Ownership Results: 
Another unverified factor for lenders to consider is the housing situation of a borrower. 
Our analysis suggests statistically significant correlation exists between one’s homeownership 
status and the probability his loan becomes delinquent. As evidenced in Table 8.6.1, renters are 
most likely to go delinquent, followed by home owners and then those who have a mortgage. 
This is also reflected in interest rate assignment as evidenced in Table 11.2.1. Once more, 
economic rationalization presents compelling explanations for this ordering.  
Table 8.6.1. Relationship Between Home Ownership and Delinquency
Probit Marginal Effects Logit Marginal Effectscoef/se coef/se coef/se coef/seMortgage (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Own 0.076*** 0.008*** 0.141*** 0.007***(0.008) (0.001) (0.016) (0.001)Rent 0.124*** 0.014*** 0.234*** 0.012***(0.005) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001)
Note: Measures marginal effect on delinquency, all else being at means. Delinquency is determined as having a loan status of "charged off,""default," or "late (31-120 days)"; robust standard errors shown below; * Denotes significance levels P<.01 - ***;  P<.05 - **;  P<.1 - *; State fixed effects included in estimation.  
Recalling our economic model, a borrower’s decision to make payments in a given period 
is restricted by ܦ௧(Φ) , the cost of a delinquency in that period on his credit situation. When 
considering how each of the three home statuses would influence this cost, we can explain the 
ordering of performance. Firstly, those individuals who are renting are burdened by a fixed 
monthly payment in addition to their loan through the Lending Club. Since a borrower’s 
disposable income must be allocated between these payments, among others, a borrower must 
choose which payment to make in times of financial constraint. If a borrower is a renter who is 
facing the prospect of a missed payment, missing a payment on a loan without collateral is more 
manageable than that of missing a rent payment and facing eviction. Next, those who are 
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homeowners may be less credit sensitive than mortgage owners as they are likely less concerned 
about their credit as they already own a home which is the largest purchase most individuals will 
need to make in their lifetime. On the other hand, since they do not have any rent payments to 
make, home owners likely have less of a monthly financial commitment to make than renters. 
Whereas renters and homeowners may be willing to forego payment, borrowers who 
have a mortgage are often highly incentivized to make loan payments given that a late payment 
on a Lending Club loan will influence their credit score. Since adjustable-rate-mortgages and 
refinancing applications are extremely common today, someone with a mortgage is highly 
sensitive to his credit score as changing it can either significantly increase or decrease his 
monthly mortgage payment amount. Thus, even though mortgage payments are typically higher 
than rent payments and therefore more difficulty to make, those with a mortgage have the highest 
potential cost of default, ܦ௧(Φ), and thus are most likely to repay their loans. 
8.7 Discussion of Predictive Power of Interest Rates Compared to All Variables: 
 Briefly returning to our theoretical model discussion, we seek to determine whether it is 
optimal for investors to consider more factors in their analysis or merely defer to the Lending 
Club’s interest rate assignment process in determining whether to invest in a loan. In Table 8.7.1 
below, we compare the explanatory powers of a probit and logit analysis on loan delinquency for 
just the Lending Club’s assigned interest rate with our earlier described probit and logit analysis 
using all variables a lender can see at the time he chooses to fund a loan. Once more we use 
robust standard errors. Our results demonstrate that a model encompassing all variables available 
to a lender except for the interest rate has more predictive power about the borrower’s 
performance than an interest rate alone based on the higher Adjusted ܴଶ of the second 
regression. While such a disparity exists, the relative cost of carrying out additional analysis and 
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research on the many factors available for consideration in a loan application may not merit a 
lender conducting extensive additional analysis. Moreover, some of this increase must be 
attributed to the model having more variables regardless of their economic impact. Thus, we find 
lenders can receive a statistically significant marginal increase in predictive power by 
considering a myriad of verified and unverified factors but that likely these deviations are 
economically insignificant.  
Table 8.7.1. Predictive Power of Interest Rates vs. All Loans
Interest Rates All Variables Less Interest Rates
Probit Logit Probit Logit
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Constant -2.476*** -4.550*** Constant 2.718*** 5.810***
(0.007) (0.014) (0.125) (0.235)
Number of observations 874,206 874,206 Number of observations 829,517 829,517
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.055 Adjusted R2 0.100 0.100
Note: * Denotes significance levels P<.01 - ***;  P<.05 - **;  P<.1 - *;  
9. Conclusion: 
 With nearly $16 billion loans issued in its first decade as an online lending platform, 
Lending Club is the preeminent player in this market. In our analysis, we examine nearly 1 
million loans searching for systematic discrepancies between interest rate assignments and loan 
performance with regards to unverified information such as loan purpose, self-reported income 
and homeownership. As outlined in the results section, certain discrepancies do emerge that are 
statistically significant. For one, borrowers dedicated to improving credit positions through a 
Lending Club loan typically outperform other loans whereas those seeking out onetime expenses 
or looking to begin a small business or an educational endeavor often underperform. Similarly, 
we find compelling reasoning that mortgage holders are less likely to become delinquent than 
homeowners who are less likely than renters. In the future, we recommend further research into 
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discrepancies across geographies as lenders are able to filter by state and our analyses suggest 
further discrepancies may emerge when considering loans by state or even zip code. 
 While these discrepancies emerge, as discussed in Section 8.7, the Lending Club has 
created a marketplace that lacks significant opportunities for feasible arbitrage. The economic 
impact of one loan being less likely to become delinquent than another by fractions of a percent 
suggests it is economically intractable to exploit these inefficiencies. For institutional investors, 
exploiting loan purposes is manageable through automated trading algorithms, but those 
algorithmic trading schemes will favor diversification across loan purposes rather than an 
exclusive pursuit of a few factors. For consumer lenders selecting only a few loans for a small 
amount, it is possible that opting for certain purposes over another within a given subgrade is 
reasonable using the filter tool, but they would have to gain more access to Lending Club’s 
interest rate assignment model to ensure they are in fact making a sound judgment in choosing 
one purpose over another.  
 Adopting the language of Fama (1991) for efficiency in equity markets, predictability 
becomes a central issue in assessing the market efficiency of Lending Club and other online 
peer-to-peer lending markets. In analyzing past performance data, we have been able to find 
discrepancies between loan performance and interest rates that suggest someone who controlled 
for other factors could theoretically select loans of a certain purpose over another within a given 
subgrade and receive an elevated return. As discussed, however, our findings indicate Lending 
Club has constructed what Fama describes as a “weaker and economically more sensible” 
efficiency in which market “prices reflect information to the point where the marginal benefits of 
acting on information do not exceed the marginal costs.” With Lending Club continuously 
assessing and analyzing its interest rate algorithms, investors are able to find past trends in 
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performance with respect to unverified information but should not expect to find opportunities 
for outsized returns. For this platform company seeking to become the dominant player in what 
is currently a two-sided market, Lending Club’s market efficiency will serve it will in 
strengthening its position as the U.S. leader in online peer-to-peer lending. 
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11. Appendix:  
11.1 Summary Statistics        
Table 11.1.1. Summary Statistics for Quantitative Variables
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min MaxLoan AmountsListed amount of loan 874,206 $14,767.70 $8.43 $0.50 $35.00Amount Funded 874,206 $14,755.20 $8,426.41 $500.00 $35,000.00Amount Funded by Investors 874,206 $14,724.40 $8,432.43 $0.00 $35,000.00Monthly Installment 874,206 $437.02 $244.05 $15.69 $1,445.46
Borrower CharacteristicsMedian FICO Score 874,206 696.95 30.4777 627 847.5Borrower Reported Annual Income 874,206 $75,004.80 $64,705.00 $0.00 $9,500,000.00Length of employment, in years 830,084 6.01686 3.66398 0 10Percent debt-to-income 874,206 18.16% 17.29% 0.00% 9999.00%30-Day Delinquency Incidents Past 2 years 874,206 0.314548 0.862319 0 39Inquiries Past 6 Months 874,206 0.68405 0.966461 0 8Open Credit Lines 874,206 11.5506 5.31094 0 90Number of Deraogatory Public Records 874,206 0.195344 0.582414 0 86Total Credit Revolving Balance 874,206 $16,880.20 $22,190.00 $0.00 $2,900,000.00Revolving Line Utilization Rate 874,206 0.551124 0.238052 0 8.923Total Number of Credit Lines 874,206 25.274 11.8267 2 169
Payment ResultsRemaining Outstanding Principal (Total) 874,206 $8,377.50 $8,462.71 $0.00 $49,372.90Remaining Outstanding Principal (Investor) 874,206 $8,374.09 $8,459.27 $0.00 $49,372.90Payments Received (Total) 874,206 $7,610.66 $7,862.84 $0.00 $57,777.60Payments Received (Investor Portion) 874,206 $7,581.32 $7,840.01 $0.00 $57,777.60Principal Received to Date 874,206 $5,794.09 $6,623.58 $0.00 $35,000.00Total Interest Received 874,206 $1,770.13 $2,098.79 $0.00 $24,205.60Late Fees Receieved to Date 874,206 $0.39 $4.04 $0.00 $358.68Fraction of Principle Repaid 874,206 42.26% 37.28% 0.00% 100.00%
Geographic VariablesCounty Per Capita Income ($ in thousands) 874,206 41.6038 12.9489 21.0512 167.901County Population (in thousands) 874,206 929.838 1530.43 3.56681 9861.82  
 The table above illustrates summary statistics for all variables in the Loan Stats dataset. 
They are grouped into variables dealing with the size of the loan, characteristics of the borrower, 
the borrower’s payment history, and geographic variables of the borrower’s area. 
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Table 11.1.2. Loan Purpose by Loan Subgrade
Loan Purpose A B C D E F G Total
Car Financing 2,327 2,644 2,080 1,004 443 151 31 8,680
27% 30% 24% 12% 5% 2% 0% 100%
Refinancing Credit Card 50,575 71,792 50,522 20,579 7,844 1,816 299 203,427
25% 35% 25% 10% 4% 1% 0% 100%
Consolidate Debt 72,761 143,102 150,455 87,699 45,812 14,362 3,109 517,300
14% 28% 29% 17% 9% 3% 1% 100%
Educational 78 101 88 31 13 4 1 316
25% 32% 28% 10% 4% 1% 0% 100%
Home Improvement 9,870 14,270 13,536 7,444 4,127 1,399 342 50,988
19% 28% 27% 15% 8% 3% 1% 100%
Home Down Payment 379 608 778 731 606 343 159 3,604
11% 17% 22% 20% 17% 10% 4% 100%
Major Purchase 3,847 4,680 4,261 2,402 1,175 425 102 16,892
 23% 28% 25% 14% 7% 3% 1% 100%
Medical Expenses 822 1,791 2,538 1,839 941 355 77 8,363
10% 21% 30% 22% 11% 4% 1% 100%
Moving Expenses 337 790 1,489 1,471 793 332 76 5,288
6% 15% 28% 28% 15% 6% 1% 100%
Other 3,599 8,183 12,163 9,922 5,189 2,200 605 41,861
9% 20% 29% 24% 12% 5% 1% 100%
Renewable Energy Financing 57 89 141 140 83 41 10 561
10% 16% 25% 25% 15% 7% 2% 100%
Small Business Loan 825 1,419 2,253 2,475 1,782 888 373 10,015
8% 14% 22% 25% 18% 9% 4% 100%
Vacation 436 973 1,547 1,110 440 125 22 4,653
9% 21% 33% 24% 9% 3% 0% 100%
Wedding Expenses 441 535 471 487 201 101 22 2,258
20% 24% 21% 22% 9% 4% 1% 100%
Total 146,354 250,977 242,322 137,334 69,449 22,542 5,228 874,206
17% 29% 28% 16% 8% 3% 1% 100%
 
 The table above displays the set of all loans Lending Club has issued grouped by purpose 
on the vertical axis and loan grade on the horizontal axis. The total for each grade and purpose 
can be found on the ends. 
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Table 11.1.3. Loan Status by Loan Subgrade
Status A B C D E F G
Charged Off 2,195 7,845 9,739 8,002 4,680 2,286 591
6% 22% 28% 23% 13% 6% 2%
Current 71,454 120,300 120,460 69,252 33,792 10,428 2,366
17% 28% 28% 16% 8% 2% 1%
Default 11 38 72 47 32 18 5
5% 17% 32% 21% 14% 8% 2%
Fully Paid 32,099 52,614 40,716 23,245 9,923 3,707 908
20% 32% 25% 14% 6% 2% 1%
In Grace Period 261 1,000 1,522 1,235 744 299 90
5% 19% 30% 24% 14% 6% 2%
Late (16-30 days) 98 333 549 477 332 121 42
5% 17% 28% 24% 17% 6% 2%
Late (31-120 days) 378 1,569 2,715 2,273 1,479 603 191
4% 17% 29% 25% 16% 7% 2%
Total 106,496 183,699 175,773 104,531 50,982 17,462 4,193
17% 29% 27% 16% 8% 3% 1%
 
The table above sorts each loan by its status within each subgrade. The percentages 
denote the percent across each loan status rather than each loan grade.
Table 11.1.4. Loan Term by Loan Subgrade
Term A B C D E F G Total
36 Months 103,315 155,502 117,963 58,657 16,567 3,525 369 455,898
23% 34% 26% 13% 4% 1% 0% 100%
60 Months 3,181 28,197 57,810 45,874 34,415 13,937 3,824 187,238
2% 15% 31% 25% 18% 7% 2% 100%
Total 106,496 183,699 175,773 104,531 50,982 17,462 4,193 643,136  
 
The table above sorts each loan grade by term of the loan. 
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11.2 Regression Results 
Table 11.2.1. Interest Rate Estimations
OLS Random Effects (State) Fixed Effects (State)coef/se coef/se coef/se
Loan Purposes
Car Financing (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Refinancing Credit Card -1.655*** -1.655*** -1.654***
(0.033) (0.026) (0.026)
Consolidate Debt -0.184*** -0.184*** -0.187***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Educational 0.282** 0.282*** 0.273**
(0.116) (0.106) (0.108)
Home Improvement 0.298*** 0.298*** 0.294***
(0.035) (0.031) (0.033)
Home Down Payment 2.879*** 2.879*** 2.875***
(0.078) (0.086) (0.086)
Major Purchase 0.389*** 0.389*** 0.384***
(0.040) (0.044) (0.046)
Medical Expenses 1.981*** 1.981*** 1.977***
(0.049) (0.046) (0.046)
Moving Expenses 3.140*** 3.140*** 3.126***
(0.059) (0.071) (0.068)
Other 2.183*** 2.183*** 2.174***
(0.036) (0.033) (0.035)
Renewable Energy Financing 2.915*** 2.915*** 2.904***
(0.157) (0.125) (0.125)
Small Business Loan 3.275*** 3.275*** 3.269***
(0.049) (0.057) (0.057)
Vacation 2.151*** 2.151*** 2.141***
(0.058) (0.064) (0.062)
Wedding Expenses 1.280*** 1.280*** 1.273***
(0.072) (0.065) (0.067)
Home Ownership
Mortgage (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Own 0.446*** 0.446*** 0.433***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Rent 0.485*** 0.485*** 0.476***
(0.008) (0.018) (0.012)
Note: Linear regression of the interest raid assigned by Lending Club; Model uses robust standard errors with both ordinary least squares and fixed and random state effects; * Denotes significance levels P<.01 - ***;  P<.05 - **;  P<.1 - *; 
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Table 11.2.1. Interest Rate Estimations
OLS Random Effects (State) Fixed Effects (State)
coef/se coef/se coef/se
Loan Characteristics
36 Month Loan (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
60 Month Loan 3.837*** 3.837*** 3.836***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.016)
Listed amount of loan 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Median FICO Score -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.056***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Length of employment, in years -0.002** -0.002 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Per Capita Income Per County -0.003*** -0.003** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
County Population 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Borrower Reported Annual Income -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Percent debt-to-income 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
30-Day Delinquency Incidents Past 2 years 0.010** 0.010* 0.009
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Inquiries Past 6 Months 0.903*** 0.903*** 0.907***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
Open Credit Lines 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of Deraogatory Public Records -0.008 -0.008 -0.007
(0.006) (0.011) (0.011)
Total Credit Revolving Balance -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revolving Line Utilization Rate 1.142*** 1.142*** 1.144***
(0.023) (0.048) (0.050)
Total Number of Credit Lines -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.044***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Percent Funded by Investors (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Note: Linear regression of the interest raid assigned by Lending Club; Model uses robust standard errors with both ordinary least squares and fixed and random state effects; * Denotes significance levels P<.01 - ***;  P<.05 - **;  P<.1 - *; 
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Table 11.2.1. Interest Rate Estimations
OLS Random Effects (State) Fixed Effects (State)
coef/se coef/se coef/se
Year
2008 0.570*** 0.570*** 0.576**
(0.171) (0.212) (0.222)
2009 1.917*** 1.917*** 1.929***
(0.165) (0.195) (0.203)
2010 0.504*** 0.504** 0.512**
(0.164) (0.209) (0.218)
2011 0.656*** 0.656*** 0.661***
(0.163) (0.205) (0.216)
2012 1.941*** 1.941*** 1.945***
(0.162) (0.196) (0.208)
2013 2.421*** 2.421*** 2.426***
(0.162) (0.217) (0.230)
2014 1.304*** 1.304*** 1.309***
(0.162) (0.215) (0.227)
2015 0.217 0.217 0.224
(0.162) (0.210) (0.223)
Statistics
Constant 48.316*** 48.316*** 48.311***
(0.198) (0.268) (0.273)
F 26,288.635 415,485.120
Number of observations 829,643 829,643 829,643
R2 0.538 0.538
Adjusted R2 0.538 0.538
Note: Linear regression of the interest raid assigned by Lending Club; Model uses robust standard errors with both ordinary least squares and fixed and random state effects; * Denotes significance levels P<.01 - ***;  P<.05 - **;  P<.1 - *;  
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Table 11.2.2. Probit Logit Delinquency Analysis 
Probit Logit
coef/se coef/se
Loan Purposes
Car Financing (dropped) (dropped)
Refinancing Credit Card -0.090*** -0.187***
(0.023) (0.047)
Consolidate Debt 0.055** 0.097**
(0.023) (0.046)
Educational 0.232** 0.441***
(0.091) (0.167)
Home Improvement 0.104*** 0.198***
(0.025) (0.050)
Home Down Payment 0.216*** 0.400***
(0.038) (0.073)
Major Purchase 0.089*** 0.161***
(0.028) (0.055)
Medical Expenses 0.225*** 0.434***
(0.031) (0.061)
Moving Expenses 0.271*** 0.514***
(0.034) (0.066)
Other 0.195*** 0.375***
(0.024) (0.049)
Renewable Energy Financing 0.337*** 0.634***
(0.078) (0.147)
Small Business Loan 0.466*** 0.875***
(0.028) (0.054)
Vacation 0.181*** 0.351***
(0.037) (0.073)
Wedding Expenses -0.042 -0.074
(0.042) (0.081)
Home Ownership
Mortgage (dropped) (dropped)
Own 0.076*** 0.141***
(0.008) (0.016)
Rent 0.124*** 0.234***
(0.005) (0.010)
Note: Estimates probit and logit models for delinquency; delinquency is determined as having a loan status of "charged off,""default," or "late (31-120 days)"; robust standard errors shown below; * Denotes significance levels P<.01 - ***;  P<.05 - **;  P<.1 - *; State fixed effects included in estimation.
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Table 11.2.2. Probit Logit Delinquency Analysis 
Probit Logit
coef/se coef/se
Income Verification
None (dropped) (dropped)
Income Source Verified 0.043*** 0.084***
(0.006) (0.012)
Income Verified 0.068*** 0.126***
(0.006) (0.012)
Loan Characteristics
36 Month Loan (dropped) (dropped)
60 Month Loan 0.178*** 0.350***
(0.005) (0.010)
Listed amount of loan 0.009*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.001)
Median FICO Score -0.006*** -0.011***
(0.000) (0.000)
Length of employment, in years -0.005*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.001)
Per Capita Income Per County -0.001*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
County Population 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Borrower Reported Annual Income -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Percent debt-to-income 0.010*** 0.018***
(0.000) (0.001)
30-Day Delinquency Incidents Past 2 years 0.011*** 0.020***
(0.003) (0.005)
Inquiries Past 6 Months 0.095*** 0.182***
(0.002) (0.004)
Open Credit Lines 0.003*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001)
Number of Deraogatory Public Records -0.033*** -0.064***
(0.005) (0.010)
Total Credit Revolving Balance -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Revolving Line Utilization Rate 0.076*** 0.186***
(0.013) (0.026)
Total Number of Credit Lines -0.004*** -0.007***
(0.000) (0.001)
Percent Funded by Investors 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Note: Estimates probit and logit models for delinquency; delinquency is determined as having a loan status of "charged off,""default," or "late (31-120 days)"; robust standard errors shown below; * Denotes significance levels P<.01 - ***;  P<.05 - **;  P<.1 - *; State fixed effects included in estimation.
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Table 11.2.2. Probit Logit Delinquency Analysis 
Probit Logit
coef/se coef/se
Year
2007 (dropped) (dropped)
2008 -0.152 -0.338*
(0.104) (0.190)
2009 -0.224** -0.412**
(0.098) (0.177)
2010 -0.252*** -0.466***
(0.096) (0.174)
2011 -0.190** -0.354**
(0.096) (0.172)
2012 -0.223** -0.427**
(0.095) (0.172)
2013 -0.353*** -0.669***
(0.095) (0.172)
2014 -0.587*** -1.119***
(0.095) (0.172)
2015 -1.176*** -2.368***
(0.095) (0.172)
Statistics
Constant 2.718*** 5.810***
(0.125) (0.235)
Number of observations 829,517 829,517
Adjusted R2 0.100 0.100
Note: Estimates probit and logit models for delinquency; delinquency is determined as having a loan status of "charged off,""default," or "late (31-120 days)"; robust standard errors shown below; * Denotes significance levels P<.01 - ***;  P<.05 - **;  P<.1 - *; State fixed effects included in estimation.  
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Table 11.2.3. Probit Logit Delinquency Marginal Effects
Probit Logit
coef/se coef/se
Loan Purposes
Car Financing (dropped) (dropped)
Refinancing Credit Card -0.009*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
Consolidate Debt 0.006** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
Educational 0.030** 0.026**
(0.014) (0.011)
Home Improvement 0.012*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.002)
Home Down Payment 0.027*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.004)
Major Purchase 0.010*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003)
Medical Expenses 0.029*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.004)
Moving Expenses 0.036*** 0.031***
(0.005) (0.004)
Other 0.024*** 0.021***
(0.003) (0.002)
Renewable Energy Financing 0.047*** 0.040***
(0.013) (0.012)
Small Business Loan 0.071*** 0.063***
(0.004) (0.004)
Vacation 0.022*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.004)
Wedding Expenses -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Home Ownership
Mortgage (dropped) (dropped)
Own 0.008*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001)
Rent 0.014*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001)
Note: Measures marginal effect on delinquency, all else being at means. Delinquency is determined as having a loan status of "charged off,""default," or "late (31-120 days)"; robust standard errors shown below; * Denotes significance levels P<.01 - ***;  P<.05 - **;  P<.1 - *; State fixed effects included in estimation.
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Income Verification
None (dropped) (dropped)
Income Source Verified 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Income Verified 0.008*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
Loan Characteristics
36 Month Loan (dropped) (dropped)
60 Month Loan 0.021*** 0.019***
(0.001) (0.001)
Listed amount of loan 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Median FICO Score -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Length of employment, in years -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Per Capita Income Per County -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
County Population 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Borrower Reported Annual Income -0.0001*** -0.0002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Percent debt-to-income 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
30-Day Delinquency Incidents Past 2 years 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Inquiries Past 6 Months 0.011*** 0.009***
(0.000) (0.000)
Open Credit Lines 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Number of Deraogatory Public Records -0.004*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.000)
Total Credit Revolving Balance -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Revolving Line Utilization Rate 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.001)
Total Number of Credit Lines -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Percent Funded by Investors 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
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Year
2007 (dropped) (dropped)
2008 -0.041 -0.051*
(0.030) (0.031)
2009 -0.059** -0.061**
(0.028) (0.029)
2010 -0.065** -0.068**
(0.028) (0.029)
2011 -0.051* -0.053*
(0.028) (0.029)
2012 -0.059** -0.063**
(0.028) (0.029)
2013 -0.087*** -0.091***
(0.028) (0.029)
2014 -0.129*** -0.131***
(0.028) (0.029)
2015 -0.188*** -0.188***
(0.028) (0.029)
Number of observations 829,517 829,517
Note: * Denotes significance levels P<.01 - ***;  P<.05 - **;  P<.1 - *;
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Table 11.2.4. Fraction of Principle Repaid Linear Regression Analysis
OLS Random Effects (State)
Fixed Effects (State)
Loan Purposes coef/se coef/se coef/se
Car Financing (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Refinancing Credit Card 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***(0.005) (0.003) (0.003)Consolidate Debt -0.007 -0.007* -0.007*(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)Educational -0.032** -0.032** -0.031**(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)Home Improvement -0.011** -0.011** -0.011**(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)Home Down Payment -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.040***(0.011) (0.010) (0.010)Major Purchase -0.005 -0.005 -0.005(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)Medical Expenses -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031***(0.008) (0.007) (0.006)Moving Expenses -0.025*** -0.025** -0.025**(0.009) (0.011) (0.011)Other -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029***(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)Renewable Energy Financing -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.081***(0.025) (0.020) (0.020)Small Business Loan -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.084***(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)Vacation -0.024** -0.024* -0.025*(0.010) (0.013) (0.013)Wedding Expenses -0.001 -0.001 -0.001(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Home Ownership
Mortgage (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Own -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011***(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)Rent -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011***(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Income Verification
None (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Income Source Verified -0.004* -0.004* -0.004*(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)Income Amount Verified -0.005** -0.005** -0.004**(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Loan Characteristics
36 Month Loan (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
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Table 11.2.5. Probit Logit Delinquency Analysis by Loangrade Effects 
Loan Grade 
Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit 
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Loan Purposes 
Car Financing (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
Refinancing Credit Card -0.007 -0.053 0.021 0.023 -0.005 -0.005 0.133* 0.244 0.112 0.219 -0.181 -0.314 
(0.060) (0.137) (0.045) (0.093) (0.057) (0.113) (0.080) (0.153) (0.087) (0.163) (0.124) (0.214)
Consolidate Debt 0.086 0.158 0.096** 0.176* 0.057 0.120 0.187** 0.352** 0.151* 0.294* -0.105 -0.184 
(0.059) (0.134) (0.044) (0.091) (0.057) (0.111) (0.078) (0.150) (0.085) (0.160) (0.119) (0.206)
Educational 0.072 0.127 0.339** 0.628** 0.016 0.049 0.547* 0.953* 0.884** 1.490** -0.468 -0.714 
(0.251) (0.538) (0.162) (0.297) (0.223) (0.407) (0.316) (0.521) (0.377) (0.608) (0.712) (1.222)
Home Improvement 0.087 0.173 0.159*** 0.312*** 0.086 0.192 0.193** 0.353** 0.123 0.249 -0.177 -0.317 
(0.065) (0.148) (0.047) (0.099) (0.060) (0.119) (0.083) (0.159) (0.089) (0.168) (0.127) (0.220)
Home Down Payment 0.141 0.314 0.143 0.281 -0.036 -0.039 0.201* 0.398* 0.205* 0.401** -0.202 -0.339 
(0.127) (0.276) (0.088) (0.174) (0.104) (0.205) (0.115) (0.217) (0.107) (0.200) (0.146) (0.255)
Major Purchase 0.062 0.098 0.103* 0.185* -0.054 -0.104 0.191** 0.348** 0.202** 0.391** -0.101 -0.184 
(0.073) (0.165) (0.054) (0.112) (0.069) (0.137) (0.091) (0.173) (0.097) (0.181) (0.140) (0.244)
Medical Expenses 0.216** 0.446** 0.190*** 0.400*** 0.119 0.248* 0.213** 0.406** 0.141 0.285 -0.201 -0.351 
(0.102) (0.222) (0.067) (0.138) (0.075) (0.148) (0.094) (0.179) (0.101) (0.187) (0.145) (0.252)
Moving Expenses 0.308*** 0.635*** 0.233*** 0.462*** 0.091 0.176 0.207** 0.373** 0.204** 0.400** -0.114 -0.191 
(0.118) (0.246) (0.081) (0.161) (0.089) (0.176) (0.099) (0.188) (0.102) (0.189) (0.146) (0.253)
Other 0.242*** 0.518*** 0.141*** 0.297*** 0.036 0.086 0.148* 0.278* 0.124 0.253 -0.181 -0.315 
(0.069) (0.154) (0.049) (0.102) (0.061) (0.120) (0.081) (0.155) (0.088) (0.165) (0.123) (0.212)
Renewable Energy Financing 0.714*** 1.461*** 0.457** 0.888*** 0.152 0.278 0.348* 0.538 -0.102 -0.128 -0.398 -0.695 (0.215) (0.401) (0.180) (0.330) (0.199) (0.383) (0.210) (0.398) (0.221) (0.428) (0.286) (0.525)
Small Business Loan 0.544*** 1.091*** 0.485*** 0.930*** 0.251*** 0.528*** 0.304*** 0.570*** 0.326*** 0.625*** 0.046 0.081
(0.082) (0.172) (0.060) (0.118) (0.071) (0.137) (0.089) (0.168) (0.092) (0.171) (0.128) (0.220)
Vacation 0.479*** 0.987*** 0.147* 0.316* -0.049 -0.072 0.185* 0.335* 0.089 0.181 -0.190 -0.369 
(0.112) (0.230) (0.083) (0.171) (0.090) (0.182) (0.107) (0.203) (0.116) (0.216) (0.189) (0.333)
Wedding Expenses -0.046 -0.123 -0.007 -0.012 -0.143 -0.252 -0.059 -0.089 -0.114 -0.151 -0.389** -0.661**
(0.120) (0.264) (0.087) (0.173) (0.110) (0.209) (0.122) (0.228) (0.135) (0.245) (0.185) (0.320)
Home Ownership 
Mortgage (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
Own 0.087*** 0.188*** 0.060*** 0.110*** 0.056*** 0.107*** 0.050** 0.091** 0.025 0.042 0.031 0.053
(0.028) (0.064) (0.017) (0.035) (0.019) (0.038) (0.023) (0.044) (0.023) (0.043) (0.037) (0.065)
Rent 0.077*** 0.172*** 0.080*** 0.158*** 0.094*** 0.179*** 0.078*** 0.142*** 0.101*** 0.183*** 0.136*** 0.230*** 
(0.019) (0.043) (0.011) (0.022) (0.012) (0.024) (0.015) (0.028) (0.015) (0.027) (0.024) (0.042)
FA B C D E 
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Income Verification
None (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Income Source Verified 0.018 0.046 0.015 0.034 0.033** 0.066** 0.070*** 0.130*** 0.079*** 0.142*** 0.027 0.056(0.018) (0.043) (0.011) (0.023) (0.013) (0.027) (0.018) (0.034) (0.021) (0.040) (0.042) (0.075)Income Verified 0.054** 0.126*** 0.027** 0.056** 0.047*** 0.095*** 0.070*** 0.131*** 0.068*** 0.118*** -0.004 -0.004(0.021) (0.049) (0.012) (0.024) (0.014) (0.027) (0.018) (0.034) (0.021) (0.040) (0.042) (0.074)
Loan Characteristics
36 Month Loan (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
60 Month Loan 0.124*** 0.307*** -0.004 0.023 -0.076*** -0.135*** -0.097*** -0.171*** -0.065*** -0.099*** -0.038 -0.056(0.044) (0.102) (0.015) (0.032) (0.013) (0.026) (0.015) (0.029) (0.016) (0.030) (0.033) (0.058)Listed amount of loan 0.003** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.021***(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)Median FICO Score -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Length of employment, in years 0.001 0.003 -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.015*** -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)Per Capita Income Per County -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.004***(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)County Population -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)Borrower Reported Annual Income -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.005***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)Percent Funded by Investors 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.001** 0.000*** 0.000(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
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Year
2007 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
2008 0.522 1.072 0.172 0.312 -0.217 -0.365 -0.660* -1.100* -0.171 -0.295 0.496 1.249(0.414) (1.030) (0.243) (0.457) (0.225) (0.393) (0.343) (0.571) (0.453) (0.773) (0.613) (1.313)2009 0.599 1.246 0.238 0.423 -0.241 -0.416 -0.590* -0.984* 0.065 0.115 -0.495 -0.307(0.398) (1.001) (0.245) (0.460) (0.209) (0.363) (0.342) (0.570) (0.468) (0.805) (0.570) (1.455)2010 0.388 0.800 0.265 0.465 -0.221 -0.379 -0.618* -1.038* 0.238 0.402 0.073 0.706(0.397) (1.000) (0.244) (0.457) (0.206) (0.357) (0.339) (0.563) (0.463) (0.796) (0.542) (1.432)2011 0.524 1.087 0.268 0.467 -0.111 -0.182 -0.406 -0.665 0.343 0.583 0.073 0.701(0.396) (0.997) (0.243) (0.456) (0.204) (0.353) (0.337) (0.559) (0.462) (0.794) (0.538) (1.428)2012 0.568 1.169 0.280 0.490 -0.170 -0.289 -0.465 -0.770 0.387 0.653 0.029 0.626(0.396) (0.997) (0.242) (0.455) (0.202) (0.350) (0.336) (0.557) (0.461) (0.793) (0.537) (1.429)2013 0.324 0.647 0.112 0.171 -0.277 -0.482 -0.579* -0.962* 0.202 0.346 -0.076 0.454(0.396) (0.997) (0.242) (0.455) (0.202) (0.350) (0.335) (0.556) (0.461) (0.793) (0.536) (1.428)2014 0.094 0.110 -0.141 -0.348 -0.527*** -0.955*** -0.821** -1.401** 0.015 0.017 -0.285 0.100(0.396) (0.997) (0.242) (0.455) (0.202) (0.350) (0.335) (0.556) (0.461) (0.793) (0.536) (1.428)2015 -0.437 -1.241 -0.736*** -1.737*** -1.127*** -2.245*** -1.390*** -2.542*** -0.613 -1.191 -0.822 -0.885(0.396) (0.997) (0.243) (0.455) (0.202) (0.350) (0.335) (0.557) (0.461) (0.793) (0.536) (1.428)
StatisticsConstant 0.849* 3.149*** -0.126 0.469 -0.129 0.115 0.173 0.458 -0.399 -0.483 0.193 -0.167(0.451) (1.120) (0.287) (0.556) (0.272) (0.507) (0.420) (0.739) (0.535) (0.938) (0.675) (1.662)Number of observations 139,485 139,485 238,423 238,423 142,188 142,188 70,767 70,767 66,044 66,044 21,516 21,516Note: * Denotes significance levels P<.01 - ***;  P<.05 - **;  P<.1 - *;  
 
Note: Measures probit and logit delinquency models with robust standard errors for each loan grade. Delinquency is determined as having a loan status of "charged off,""default," or "late (31-120 days)"; Denotes significance levels P<.01 - ***;  P<.05 - **;  P<.1 - *; State fixed effects included in estimation.
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Loan Grade
Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit Logitcoef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/seLoan Purposes
Car Financing (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Refinancing Credit Card -0.000 -0.001 0.006 0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.041 0.041 0.020 0.020 -0.048 -0.001(0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.006) (0.028) (0.035) (0.015) (0.014) (0.035) (0.017)Consolidate Debt 0.003 0.002 0.030** 0.026* 0.007 0.007 0.058* 0.060 0.028* 0.027** -0.029 -0.001(0.002) (0.002) (0.015) (0.016) (0.006) (0.006) (0.032) (0.044) (0.014) (0.013) (0.034) (0.009)Educational 0.003 0.002 0.113* 0.108 0.002 0.003 0.189 0.189 0.238* 0.216* -0.108 -0.004(0.011) (0.008) (0.062) (0.066) (0.026) (0.022) (0.134) (0.152) (0.134) (0.126) (0.128) (0.049)Home Improvement 0.003 0.003 0.050*** 0.049** 0.011 0.011* 0.060* 0.061 0.022 0.023 -0.047 -0.001(0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.021) (0.007) (0.006) (0.034) (0.045) (0.015) (0.014) (0.036) (0.017)Home Down Payment 0.006 0.005 0.045 0.043 -0.004 -0.002 0.063 0.069 0.039* 0.039** -0.053 -0.001(0.006) (0.005) (0.030) (0.031) (0.011) (0.010) (0.043) (0.056) (0.020) (0.019) (0.040) (0.019)Major Purchase 0.002 0.001 0.032* 0.028 -0.006 -0.005 0.060* 0.060 0.038** 0.038** -0.028 -0.001(0.003) (0.002) (0.018) (0.019) (0.008) (0.007) (0.036) (0.046) (0.017) (0.016) (0.039) (0.009)Medical Expenses 0.010* 0.008* 0.061** 0.064** 0.015 0.014* 0.067* 0.071 0.026 0.026 -0.053 -0.001(0.005) (0.004) (0.025) (0.030) (0.009) (0.008) (0.039) (0.052) (0.018) (0.017) (0.039) (0.019)Moving Expenses 0.016** 0.012** 0.076** 0.075** 0.011 0.010 0.065* 0.064 0.039** 0.039** -0.031 -0.001(0.007) (0.006) (0.031) (0.036) (0.011) (0.010) (0.039) (0.050) (0.019) (0.017) (0.041) (0.010)Other 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.044** 0.046** 0.004 0.005 0.045 0.047 0.023 0.023* -0.048 -0.001(0.003) (0.003) (0.018) (0.021) (0.007) (0.006) (0.030) (0.038) (0.015) (0.014) (0.035) (0.017)Renewable Energy Financing 0.056** 0.044** 0.157** 0.162* 0.020 0.016 0.114 0.097 -0.016 -0.010 -0.095 -0.003(0.028) (0.021) (0.072) (0.083) (0.028) (0.025) (0.083) (0.097) (0.033) (0.032) (0.060) (0.046)Small Business Loan 0.036*** 0.027*** 0.168*** 0.172*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.098** 0.104 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.013 0.000(0.007) (0.005) (0.033) (0.049) (0.010) (0.009) (0.044) (0.065) (0.017) (0.016) (0.037) (0.004)Vacation 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.046 0.049 -0.005 -0.004 0.058 0.057 0.016 0.016 -0.050 -0.002(0.009) (0.007) (0.028) (0.032) (0.010) (0.009) (0.040) (0.049) (0.021) (0.019) (0.049) (0.021)Wedding Expenses -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.015 -0.012 -0.017 -0.013 -0.018 -0.012 -0.094** -0.003(0.004) (0.003) (0.026) (0.024) (0.011) (0.009) (0.035) (0.035) (0.021) (0.019) (0.044) (0.043)
Home Ownership
Mortgage (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Own 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.019*** 0.017** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.016* 0.017 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.000(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.013) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003)Rent 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.026** 0.027* 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.035*** 0.001(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.010) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.013)
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Table 11.2.6. Probit Logit Delinquency Analysis Marginal Effects by Loan Grade 
Note: Measures marginal effects on delinquency for probit and logit models with robust standard errors for each loan grade. Delinquency is determined as having a loan status of "charged off,""default," or "late (31-120 days)"; Denotes significance levels P<.01 - ***;  P<.05 - **;  P<.1 - *; State fixed effects included in estimation.
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Income Verification
None (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
Income Source Verified 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.004** 0.004** 0.023** 0.024 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.007 0.000(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.010) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.003)Income Verified 0.002** 0.002** 0.009** 0.009* 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.023** 0.024 0.013*** 0.012*** -0.001 -0.000(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.000)
Loan Characteristics
36 Month Loan (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
60 Month Loan 0.006** 0.005*** -0.001 0.004 -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.032*** -0.032* -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.010 -0.000(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.012) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003)Listed amount of loan 0.000** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.000(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)Median FICO Score -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Length of employment, in years 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003** -0.003* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)Per Capita Income Per County -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)County Population -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)Borrower Reported Annual Income -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)Percent Funded by Investors 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Year
2007 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
2008 0.043* 0.040 0.066 0.073 -0.058 -0.055 -0.258** -0.267** -0.041 -0.039 0.190 0.003(0.025) (0.026) (0.093) (0.107) (0.064) (0.063) (0.130) (0.135) (0.116) (0.112) (0.223) (0.030)2009 0.053** 0.051** 0.092 0.101 -0.063 -0.061 -0.231* -0.239* 0.017 0.017 -0.149 -0.001(0.021) (0.023) (0.095) (0.109) (0.060) (0.060) (0.133) (0.140) (0.122) (0.118) (0.195) (0.021)2010 0.028 0.026 0.103 0.111 -0.059 -0.056 -0.242* -0.252* 0.068 0.066 0.026 0.002(0.020) (0.022) (0.094) (0.109) (0.060) (0.059) (0.131) (0.137) (0.120) (0.117) (0.192) (0.020)2011 0.043** 0.041* 0.104 0.112 -0.031 -0.029 -0.158 -0.160 0.103 0.101 0.026 0.002(0.019) (0.022) (0.094) (0.108) (0.059) (0.059) (0.134) (0.142) (0.120) (0.116) (0.190) (0.020)2012 0.049** 0.046** 0.109 0.117 -0.046 -0.044 -0.182 -0.186 0.117 0.116 0.010 0.002(0.019) (0.022) (0.094) (0.108) (0.059) (0.058) (0.133) (0.141) (0.120) (0.116) (0.189) (0.018)2013 0.022 0.019 0.043 0.040 -0.072 -0.069 -0.227* -0.234* 0.057 0.056 -0.026 0.001(0.019) (0.021) (0.092) (0.105) (0.059) (0.058) (0.131) (0.138) (0.120) (0.116) (0.189) (0.014)2014 0.005 0.003 -0.051 -0.074 -0.121** -0.118** -0.318*** -0.337*** 0.004 0.003 -0.092 0.000(0.019) (0.021) (0.088) (0.097) (0.059) (0.058) (0.122) (0.122) (0.120) (0.116) (0.189) (0.003)2015 -0.014 -0.016 -0.223*** -0.260*** -0.187*** -0.184*** -0.492*** -0.528*** -0.115 -0.116 -0.216 -0.005(0.019) (0.021) (0.082) (0.100) (0.059) (0.058) (0.107) (0.121) (0.120) (0.116) (0.189) (0.070)
Number of observations 139,485 139,485 238,423 238,423 142,188 142,188 70,767 70,767 66,044 66,044 21,516 21,516Note: * Denotes significance levels P<.01 - ***;  P<.05 - **;  P<.1 - *;Note: G loans omitted for insufficient number of observations
 
